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ABSTRACT 
This paper attempts to evaluate, in a rather limited
sense, the exchange experience of the Philippines during the
period of generalized currency floating. The nature of the
post-1970 exchange rate regime is analyzed, and various im­
plications of flexibility of the country's own as well as
other countries' exchange rates are discussed. Furthermore,
changes in the peso-u.s. dollar exchange rate are examined in
the light of official intervention behavior in the foreign
exchange market. The Philippines adopted a flexihle exchange
rate system in early 1970 and has kept it in place since then.
In many respects, this system has assisted the country in wea­
thering the external shocks which began with the oil crisis
in 1973-74 without the exchange upheavals reminiscent of the
1950's and 1960's. While external balance is yet to be
achieved, the post-1970 exchange rate regime, which is more
precisPly characterized by limited rather than full flexibility,
has Probably prevented more fundamental disequilibrium from
developing, making abrupt and disruptive exchange rate adjust­
ments less of a possibility. The analysis of official
intervention behavior in the Philippine foreign exchange
market demonstrates the importance of the current account in
the exchange rate adjustments undertaken by the monetary
authorities, as well as the latter's commitment to the nominal
peso-U.S~ dollar exchange rate. The second observation can be
exnlained by the peso's traditional link to the U.S. dollar.
However, because major currencies are floating, preoccupation
with the nominal exchange rate has resulted in effective ex­
change rates which are not in the direction suggested bv the
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EXCHANGE RATE FLEXIBILITY AND INTERVENTION 
POLICY IN THE PHILIPPINES, 1973-1981 
Filologo Pante, Jr. 
Discussions involving the system of generalized currency floating as 
this relates to the less developed countries (LDC's) have two aspects, 
namely: (1) the effects on LDC economies of the adoption of more flexible 
exchange rates by industrialized countries; and (2) the implications of 
exchange rate flexibility in LDC's themselves. 1 This paper deals primarily 
with the second issue. It attempts to evaluate, no doubt in a limited 
manner, the exchange exnerience of the Philippines during the oeriod 
of generalized floating of major currencies. 
Section 1 provides a brief historical perspective on the 1970 ex­
change rate reform. Section 2 describes and analyzes the post-1970 
exchange rate system, highlighting some of the country's structural 
characteristics which can help explain its choice of exchange rate regime. 
Changes in the nominal peso-dollar exchange rate are examined, and specu­
lative pressures during the period of greater exchange rate flexibility 
are compared to those during the earlier period of adjustable par values. 
Section 3 introduces the framework for analyzing exchange rate changes in 
a world of floating rates. Quarterly nominal and real effective exchange 
rates are calculated and discussed, and the contribution of exogenous 
currency realignments on effective exchange rate movements are assessed. 
Furthermore, the variability of monthly effective exchange rates during 
1973-1981 is compared to that in 1964-1972. Section 4 studies exchange 
2 
rate changes in the light of official intervention behavior in the foreign 
exchange market. Alternative hypotheses about such behavior are formulated 
and tested. Finall;1, the major findings of the studv are summarized in 
Sect:i.on 5. 
The Philippines adopted a flexible exchange rate system in early 1970 
and has kent it in place since then. In manv respects, this system has 
assisted the country in weatherin~ the external shocks which hegan with 
the oil crisis in 1973-74 without the exchange upheavals reminiscent of 
the 1950's and 1960's. khile external balance is yet to be achieved, the 
post-1970 exchange rate regime, wliich is more precisely characterized by 
limited rather than full flex:ih:ility, has probably prevented more fundamen­
tal disequilibrium from developing, making abrupt and disruptive exchange 
rate adjustments less of a possibilitv. The analysis of official interven­
tion behavior in the Philippine foreign exchange market demonstrates the 
importance of the current account in the exchange rate adjustments 
undertaken by the monetary authorities, as well as the latter's commitment 
to the peso-u.s. dollar exchange rate. Eowever, because major currencies 
are floating, preoccupation with the nominal exchange rate has resulted 
in effective exchange rate changes which are not in the direction suggested 
bv the underlying halance of oayments developments in many instances. 
1. The 1970 Exchange Rate Refonn 
The Philipoines already had a flexible exchange rate system even before 
the onset of generalized currency floating in earlv 1973. Confronted hy a 
3 
foreign exchange crisis that developed in the late 1960's, the government 
allowed the Fhilippine peso to float in the foreign exchange market on ~ 
February 21, 1970. 
It is not clear, however, whether the monetary authorities' longer 
tenn objective was in fact to shift to a flexible exchange rate regime. 
In January 1962, for example, the neso ~as allowed to float, only to he 
fixed six months later.
2 
Similarly, in the 1970 floating enisode, the 
exchange rate appears to have been stabilized bv October of that year. It 
seems, therefore, that the principal motivation for floating at the time 
of its adoption ~as to determine what the new peso-dollar exchange rate 
should he rather than to move to a flexible exchange rate system. Eventually, 
the excrrange rate would have been fixed, as in the 1960's, were it not for 
the events that subsequently characterized the international monetary scene. 
These events mav have provided a "disguised blessing" as far as the 
Philippines is concerned, in the sense that exchange rate flexibilitv 
probably enabled the country to avoid the exchange upheavals that occurred 
in the 195J's and late 1960's. ~ased on the Philipnines' exchange rate 
historv, an exchange crisis of the nronortion similar to the 1950's and 
1960's could have easilv developed in the 1970's, considering the ranid 
increases in oil prices, the sharp and extended deterioration in the terms 
of trade follo~ing these price increases,
3 
and recession in the industrialized 
countries. It will not be too difficult to see what the situation would 
have been if the government were committed to a fixed exchange rate. 
The country's exchange experience during the post-indenendence period 
unto 1970 is well documented in Baldwin (1975), Essentially, what one 
4 
can observe is a cycle consisting of a period of growing external imbal­
ances, followed by the imposition of various forms of trade and exchange 
controls, and finally, a delayed and, therefore, large devaluation when 
authorities could no longer defend the existing exchange rate. Obviously, 
the adjustment process that such a devaluation requires is costly and 
painful. Had changes in the exchange rate been undertaken more promptly, 
before relative price distortions could grow and become embedded in the 
economic system, adjustments would have been far less disruptive. But the 
problem was precisely the difficulty of making timely exchange rate adjust­
ments under the par value system even when such changes were clearly .called 
for. Accordingly, the past two devaluation episodes took place under a 
"crisis atmosphere" (Krueger, 1975; p. 50) and had been traumatic 
experiences, both politically and economically. 
Under the fixed exchange rate regime, there was a great tendency to 
consider the exchange rate as an objective rather than as an instrument 
of policy. Maintaining the existing exchange rate was a matter of national 
pride and prestige, and changes in the rate, or even prospects of such 
changes, were critical political issues. These attitudes have perhaps 
persisted under the more recent system of exchange rate flexibility, but 
to a lesser extent. Because exchange rates are ''floating," the public 
have increasingly considered changes in the exchange rate as normal 
economic phenomenon. And because these changes have been made gradually, 
adjustments have had less disruptive consequences. Furthermore, policy­
makers have probably become more confident of the µse of the exchange rate 
as an instrument of development policy; reliance on trade restrictions has 




These do not imply, however, that the mere adoption of flexible exchange 
rates in the Phili~pines has solved for it all problems of adjustment. All 
that is indicated is that exchange flexibility "can cope with much more 
serious tensions and disturbances than the previous system of fixed 
exchanges" (Haberler, 1974, p. 331). l•.'hether or not a flexible exchange 
rate regime is able to µrovide a means by which a vlable exchange rate 
can he maintained still depends on the actual conduct of exchange rate 
policy. Accordingly, the remainder of this paper looks into how exchange 
rate policy has been pursued in the country since 1970, with empahsis on 
the period of generalized currency floating, 1973-1981. 
2. The Post-1970 E:xchange Rate Regime 
The Philippine peso has been traditionally tied to the U.S. dollar, 
and it has continued to be so UP to the present time. Since the exchange 
rate reform of 1970, the spot peso-dollar exchange rate has been determined 
daily on the basis of interbank trading in the foreign exchange market.
5 
Until April 1972, the daily interbank spot peso-dollar exchange rate, or 
the "guiding rate", was based on the buying and selling rates of the last 
transaction in the foreign exchange market. Thereafter, the rate has been 
established on the basis of the weighted average of exchange rates for all 
sales made in the preceding day, the weights being the value of trading at 
each exchange rate. Exchange rates for other currencies are based on the 
spot buying and selling rates in New York of these currencies (in terms of 
U.S. dollars) at the close of the day prior to the actual nurchase in 
6 
Manila and on the Central Bank's current buying and selling rates for U.S. 
dollars. There is no domestic forward exchange market, but forward cover 
is made available by the Central Bank for transactions involving swap 
arrangements. 
While it is officially maintained that "all exchange transactions 
take place in a free market, 116 the Central Bank has exercised direct con­
trol over movements in the peso-dollar exchange rate through the purchase 
or sale of foreign exchange: "Generally, the Central Bank (or an agent 
bank acting in its behalf) stood ready to provide foreign exchange at the 
current rate to maintain the stability of the exchange rate" (Central Bank 
Annual Report, 1970; p. 70). In 1970 and 1971, the Central Bank limited 
its intervention activities in the foreign exchange market, making sales 
of only U.S. $5 million and U.S. $23.5 million, respectively. Beginning 
in 1972, however, Central Bank intervention increased substantially, its 
sales and purchases of foreign exchange accounting for a markedly increased 
proportion of the total volume of foreign exchange transactions undertaken 
by commercial banks. In 1970, this proportion was only 9.4 per cent; by 
71972, this had risen to about 60 per cent. Another instrument which has 
been used by the Central Bank to manage the exchange rate is the maintenance 
of bands or margins around the guiding rate within which the peso-dollar rate 
is allowed to float. Until April 1972, the margins were 3/4 of one per 
cent above and one per cent below the guiding rate. Subsequently, the 
exchange rate was allowed to float within a wider band of 4-1/2 per cent 
on each side of the guiding rate for the trading day. 
Aside from these forms of control over the exchange rate, there are a 
7 
nlll!lber of trade and exchange restrictions which are still in oneration, 
although as mentioned above, there has been less reliance on the former 
in the 1970's as compared to the preceding two decades. The regulations 
involving invisible payments and the capital account are still quite strin-
gent. For instance, while remittances of profits and dividends are 
generally free of restrictions, there are quantitative limitations on 
invisible payments such as those for travel abroad, educational expenses 
of students abroad and maintenance of dependents abroad. Residents are 
not allowed to purchase foreign securities nor maintain bank balances 
overseas. 
I 
However, they can maintain foreign currency bank deposits 
domestically, provided the source of the deposit is eligible for deposit.
8 
All foreign borrowings require prior Central Bank approval. 
1965; p. 2) rather than floating. This exchange arrangement is not 
It should be clear by now that the exchange rate system in the 
Philippines is one of limited rather than full flexibility, so that the 
regime may be more precisely described as a "crawling peg" (Filliamson, 
9 
unex-
pected in a develoning country like the Philippines where certain structural 
characteristics preclude free floating as a feasible alternative. Table 1 
presents a selected set of indicators of the Philippine economy which can 
help explain the country's choice of exchange rate regime, among other 
things. 
It can readily be seen why the Philippines opted to continue to be in 
the U.S. dollar currency area during the period of generalized floating 
among major currencies. Aside from the fact that the peso has been histo­
rically tied to the U.S. dollar, the U.S. has remained the Philippines' 
8
Table 1 
SELECTED ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
I. Gross Domestic Product (GDP), Population and Inflation Rate 
A. GDP (in million U.S. dollars, 1980)~/ 31,337 
B. Population (in thousand persons, mid-1980) 48,317 
C. GDP Per Capita (in U.S. dollars, 1980) 649 
1960-70 1970-80 
D. Growth Rate of Real GDP(% per year) 4.8 5.9 
E. Inflation Rate (%) 
Consumer Price Index 5.3 13.8
Wholesale Price Index 5.7 17.1
GDP Deflator 5.7 13.3 
II. Trade and Exchange Market Related Indicators 
1970 1975 1980 
A. Proportion of Trade in Goods
and Services in GDP (%) 34.4 38.4 43.9 46.2
B. Share of Traditional Exports
in Total Exports (%)E/ 79.5 78.3 63.3 43.9 
C. Share of Top Two Trading
Partners in Total Trade (%) 
a. United States 39.8 35.0 24.8 25.3
b. Japan 25.9 35.0 31.2 22.6
c. U.S. and Japan 65.7 70.0 56.0 47.9 
D. Imports According to End Use 
a. Caoital Goods£../ d 18.7 18.8 19.5 16.2
b. Intermediate Goods-/ 62.8 74.3 72.6 79.4
c. Consumer Goods 18.5 6.9 7.9 4.4 
E. Ratio of Commercial Bank to
Central Bank Holdings of
Foreign Exchange Assets (%) 48.7 51.0 52.8 60.0 
Sources: Central Bank of the Philippines, Statistical Bulletin; National
Economic and Development Authority, Philiopine Statistical
Yearbook; IMF, Financial Statistics. 
a/ Based on the GDP at 1980 pesos and the average 1980 exchange rate.
b/ Coconut oil, copra, copra meal or cake, dessicated coconut, logs
and lumber, sugar and copper concentrates.
c/ ~lachinery and equipment.
d/ Unprocessed and semi-processed raw materials, and supplies. 
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principal trading partner, although Japan has nosed a serious threat to the 
U.S. in the latter regard. That free floating is not a feasible alternative -
for the Philippines can be explained by the relative openness of the econo­
my and by the absence of an internationallv integrated financial market 
(Crockett and Nsouli, 1977; Branson and Katseli, 1978). The relatively open 
character of the Philippine economy ( the proportion of trade in goods and 
services in GDP was 46.2 per cent in 1980) does not make floating feasible 
because domestic residents would tend to want contracts to be effectively 
denominated in foreign currency, and there would be little basis for demand 
for domestic currency. On the other hand, because the domestic capital mar­
ket is not integrated internationally, the supply of and demand for foreign 
exchange would be determined mainly by current account flows, and short-
run stability depends on the Marshall-Lerner conrlitions concerning trade 
elasticities. If these conditions do not hold in the short-run, e.g., in 
view of lags in responses and relatively inflexible prices, then floating 
would be unstable. This would result in a considerable increase in uncer­
tainty, which would, in turn, adversely affect trade and investment flows. 
Changes in Nominal Exchange Rates 
From January 1970 to the end of the decade, the peso-dollar exchange 
rate increased by 93.6 per cent from 13.92 per U.S. dollar to 17.59 per 
U.S. dollar. The largest increase during this period occurred in 1970 
when the rate rose from 13.92 per U.S. dollar to 16.43 per U.S. dollar, 
representing a 64.0 per cent increase. In comparison, the exchange rate 
in the 1960's denreciated by 95.0 per cent from 12.00 per U.S. dollar to 
13.90 per U.S. dollar. 
10 
Since March 1973, when the system of generalized currency floating 
was initiated, the peso-dollar rate has risen by 20.1 per cent from 16.77 
per U.S. dollar in Uarch 1973 to 18.13 per U.S. dollar in December 1981. 
This is a considerably smaller magnitude of depreciation as compared to 
those resulting from the 1960 and 1970 devaluations. Moreover, adjustments 
have been made continuouslv in small increments (Figure 1). The average 
absolute monthly percentage change in any year since 1973 has been less 
than one per cent, the largest being 3/4 of one per cent. On an annual 
basis, the average absolute percentage change is 2.2 per cent per year. In 
this connection, it is sip,nificant to observe the orevailing interest rate 
differentials during this period. As Table 2 shows, the differentials 
have been generally kept well over the average rate of crawl of the 
exchange rate, although there were a few exceptions, .e.g., the rate dif­
ferentials ~1ith the U.K. in 1974, 1977-1979, and with the U.S. in 1979. 
Based on the predominant trend of nominal exchange rates, the exchange 
experience of the Philippines during the period of generalized currency 
floating can be divided into four sub-periods. The first is during ~arch 
1973 to the third quarter of 1974 when rates were slightly appreciating. 
The second covers the period from the last quarter of 1974 to the third 
quarter of 1975 when depreciation was the dominant trend. The third period, 
from the last quarter of 1975 to 1979, is characterized by a slight appre­
ciation and relative stability of the exchange rate. The last period 
consists of the more recent years 1980 to 1981, when the rates started 
to depreciate once again. It ~ould be useful to note the country's price 
experience during these periods. rate of domesticThe annual inflation, 
as measured by the consumer price index, was 25 per cent during the first 
Flr,urc 1 
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lNTE;\EST r,ATES IN THE PnILIPPTNES A~m SELECTED C0tTNTRTrS: 1973-1981
(End of Period f'er Cent PP.r Annum P,ates) 
1973 1974 1975 11.176 1977 1978 1<)79 lqRO 1981 
a/Philippines- 9.74 10.03 16.90 1.5.42 12.:)0 11.52 12.70 14.8.5 lG. 91
r:onp,I',ong-h/ 8. ()() 6.00 3.25 1. 75 0.. 25 4. sri 9.25 11.no 14.00 
.,1ngariore-C /<" n.a. n.a. n • ;:i • 1.7£.i !+. 54 5. 2') 7.15 11.22 12.05 
United Statcsi/ 7 .41 7.11 5.21 4.41 6.14 9.34 12.1n 13.6(1 12.97
e/Japan- 5.80 6.83 5.63 4.15 6.06 t,.Sf> 8.13 9.90 6.75
f/Germany- 7.00 5.63 3.15 2.r,s 3. 96 4.06 9.5~ 10. 27 18.82 
United Kingdoms_/ 8.31 12.42 10.99 1().611 13.51 11.% 15.34 13.02 14.78
h/Switzerland- 5 • .50 6. ()[) 1. .'.:iO 1.12 1.12 rJ.13 /1. 42 .5. 75 8.75 
Sources: Philippines - Philipoine Financial ftatistics; Pongrong - JfongKong ~fonthly Digeo:;t ofStatistics; Singapore - The Monetarv .f\uthorit" of ~i.n3anore ;.tnti stical Rul 1eti n;l\11 ')then; - n.E.c.n. tla.in Ecnnomic Tnclicntorc:;. 
a/ 1973-1974: 91-day Treasury THlls' rate; 1975-1981: 61-90-cfay mon<~v mar1u~t rates.h/ Three-month time deposit ratEis.c/ Three-month deposit rates.
cl/ 90-day Treasuy Rills' rates.
-;_; 1973-1976: 60-day Treasury 1:ills' rates; 1977-1981: "Censaki" or monc>v market rates.f/ Three-month loan rates.
"£./ 91-day Treasury Tiills' rate. ....'!2._/ Three-month deposit· rates. N 
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period, 8.1 per cent during the second period, 10.1 per cent during the 
third period, and 14.8 per cent during the last period. 
The most notable feature of the exchange rate changes described above 
is the rather limited extent of nominal depreciation from 1973 to 1981. 
Considering the magnitude of the country's trade and current account defi­
cits since 1974 (Table 3), as well as the relatively rapid rate of domestic 
inflation (Figure 2), 10 one would have expected to see a flexible exchange 
rate resulting in a larger depreciation of the domestic currency vis-a-vis 
the U.S. dollar. In general, a country confronted by current account defi­
cits can make the necessary adjustments by financing the deficits through 
borrowings from abroad or drawing down on reserves, by allowing the exchange 
rate to depreciate, or by depressing incomes or lowering prices. These op­
tions are of course not mutually exclusive. In the case of the Philippines, 
it appears that the decision taken by the monetary authorities was to mini­
mize the change in the nominal exchange rate principally through external 
financing. 
From 1973 to 1981, net long-term capital inflows averaged U.S. $906 
·11· 11mi ion per year. In contrast, the combined net long-term capital in-
flows during the immediately preceding ten years amounted to only U.S. $752 
million. As a consequence, the country's total external debt outstanding 
rose more than sixfold from U.S. $2.6 billion in December 1973 to U.S. 
$16.1 billion in September 1981. And at least up to 1980, the magnitude 
of external financing would enable the Philippine monetary authorities 
not only to maintain the level of the country's international reserves 
but also to raise it (Table 4). In 1973, international reserves 
Tarle 3 
~;ET, E(;Tf.D i\1\LA;:cr: OF l'.'\'r,·ff.i':TS nr.VELOP'·IE~iT:-, 1971-1981 
(T.n 'li11 ion r. S. llollars) 
B73 197!1 1975 197fi 1977 1978 1979 
Exports, f.o.b. 1,871 2, (,9li 2,263 2,517 3,151 3,425 4,601 
Imports, f.o.b. 1,597 3,143 3,459 1,634 3,915 4,732 6,142 
Trade Balance 274 - 449 - 1,196 - 1,117 - 764 - 1,307 - 1,541 
Services (Net) 165 - 237 257 - 394 427 178 -- - - - 390 
Transfers (Net) 333 404 464 372 344 313 355 
Current Account 
Balance 442 - 232 989- - 1,139 - 847 - 1,172 - 1,576 
Official Grants and 
Long-Term Capital 
(Net) 212 248 548 1,216 898 1,062 1,250 
Rasic Balance 654 - 34 - 441 77 51 - 110 - 326 






































































D~n::~.!:\TiiJ:1l.L R.LSERVJ:S, l ':J7;_i-l 981 
(Tn 'fil]ion U.~. Dollars) 
~,fnnt'1s of Tm11orts 
P a/Year Official ...eserves- Coverage 
b7J 23l 2.0_, 
L<71 376 3.9 
L72 54~1 5.5 
l ',•71 1,(J37 7.B 
l •,!7 l, 1,srn 5.7 
L-'7j 1,%1 4.7 
1c17(1 1,642 5.4 
L.77 1,525 4.7 
l ~,7_3 l,8q3 4.8 
L17~1 2,423 4.6 
lt_,,,:;•; 3,155 4.9 
l''~a 2,571, 3.7 
Snurcc: (>ntr.qJ fnnl-: of tl.e D1iili..,n~nes. 
~1 Tnclurlin~ gold and flU's. 
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of the Central Bank stood at U.S. $10 billion. By 1980, Central Bank 
reserves have reached U.S. $3.2 billion. In terms of monthly merchandise 
imports which a particular level of reserves can finance, the Central Bank 
has maintained a reserve level which has not fallen below an average equi­
valent of 4.3 months' imports since 1973. The corresponding figure in the 
1960's and the first two years of the 1970's averaged 2.5 months of imports. 
In 1981, the current account deficit reached a peak of U.S. $2.4 billion 
and could not be fully financed by net borrowings amounting to only U.S. 
$1.6 billion. The Central Bank obviously decided to draw down on its re­
serves rather than allow a drastic depreciation of the currency. 
Based on an interview with senior goverment officials, Bautista (1978; 
p. 4) explains the policy of shoring up foreign exchange reserves as follows: 
"The unexpectedly large current account deficit in 1974 and the perceived 
instahility in the world economy 'scared' the monetary authorities into 
exerting efforts to borrow from the international capital market and build 
up the Central Bank reserves. In the succeeding two years of increasingly 
worsening current account balance, the strategy apparently adopted was to 
maintain the high reserve level as a safeguard against speculative activi­
ti~s in the foreign exchange market. It is also claimed that the cost of 
holding these reserves has not been substantial, since their yields from 
short-term placements and time deposits have been relatively high 
(averaging 6-7%)." 
While the level of international reserves in the Philipnines has been 
relatively high in a historical sense, it is not necessarily so by inter­
national standards. Table 5 shows that in 1979, Philippine international 
18 
Table 5 
INTERNATIONAL RESERVES OF SELECTED COUNTRIES 
AND GROUPS OF COUNTRIES, 1979 
(In months of import coverage) 
A. Groups of Countries (Averages) 
1. Low-income countries 4.2 
2. Middle-income countries 5.2 
3. Industrial countries 5.0 
B. Selected Countries 




































World Development Report, 1981. 
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reserves in terms of months of import coverage was only slightly higher 
than the average for lm-: income countries (per capita GNP of up to U.S. 
$380 based on World Bank classification). On the other hand, the compara­
ble figures for middle income countries (per capita GNP of over U.S. $380) 
and industrialized countries were slightly more than that in the Philippines. 
The median reserve level in months of import coverage for all middle-income 
countries included in the 1981 World Bank World Development Report is 4.5 
months, very close to the estimate for the Philippines of 4.6 months. 
The Black Market for Foreign Exchange and Speculative Pressures 
Has disruptive speculation become less of a prohlem during the more 
recent period of limited exchange rate flexibility? During the earlier 
period of adjustable par values, anticipated large devaluations presented 
considerable opportunities for obtaining substantial pay-offs from specu­
lation. Since exchange rate adjustments have been made frequently in 
relatively small doses in the post-1970 period, there is a great likelihood 
that incentives for speculation may have been somewhat reduced. Haberler 
(1972; p. 3), referring to the Brazilian experience, suggests that even 
in the case where the currency is expected to go down and never move up in 
the foreseeable future," ••• speculation ceases to be a serious problem if 
12exchange rate changes are small enough and frequent enough." In order 
to ascertain whether this has indeed been the case for the Philippines, 
the ratios of black market rates over official or guiding rates in the 
1950 1s and 1960 1 s are compared with those in the 1970's. Inanuch as 
the Philippine black market for foreign exchange is a highly speculative 
market, such a comparison may at least provide a rough idea of the relative 
extent of speculative activity during the period of fixed and flexible 
20 
exchange rates. 
As Table 6 shows, the exchange rate was subjected to tremendous 
speculative pressures in the 1950 1 s. The smallest margin of black market 
rates over official rates was 24 per cent at the beginning of the decade. 
Thereafter, the margins exhibited an upward trend, so that by 1959, the 
black market rate was double the official exchange rate. It was during 
this period when various trade and exchange controls were introduced and 
expanded. 13 With the initiation of liberalization measures. in 1960, the 
margins were reduced to about 30 per cent in 1960 and 20 per cent in 1961. 
The margins further contracted in 1962 when exchange decontrol was imple­
mented. In the following years of decontrol until the first half of 1967, 
the black market rate for foreign exchange stayed close to the official
14exchaneP rate. However, when the trade balance -worsened from a deficit 
of U.S. $25 million in 1966 to a deficit of U.S. $242 million in 1967, the 
black market became bullish again; the premium moved from 16 per cent during 
the last quarter of 1968 to 43 per cent in the same quarter the following 
year. In January 1970, one month before the peso was allowed to float, 
the margin stood at almost 60 oer cent. 
The 1970 exchange reform appears to have relieved the pressure on the 
exchange rate, and for the rest of the 1970's, the margins would remain 
within 5-10 per cent except in the last quarter of 1975, when the margin 
hit 14 per cent. The relatively stable and lower margins during this more 
recent exchange rate history are worth noting. 15 Considering the.country's 
substantial trade and current account deficits since 1974 and the relatively 









RATIOS OF BLACK MARKET TO OFFICIAL EXCHANGE RATES
(Quarterly: 1950-1979) 
Year I II III IV Average 
1.24 1.41 1.41 1.84 1.48 
1951 1.73 1.61 1.32 1.33 1.50 
1952 1.33 1.24 1.29 1.33 1.30 
1953 1.33 1.32 1.30 1.31 1.32 
1954 1.32 1.32 1.38 1.44 1.36 
1.47 1.40 1.38 1.44 1.42 
1956 1.53 1.59 1.61 1.77 1.63 
1957 1.74 1.78 1.69 1.69 1.73 
1958 1.70 1.61 1.70 1.77 1.70 
1959 1.89 2.10 2.16 1.90 2.01 
1.29 1.28 1.32 1.26 1.29 
1961 1.06 1.15 1.20 1.32 1.18 
1962 1.00 1.06 1.06 1.08 1.05 
1963 1.01 ·l.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 
1964 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
1.01 1.03 1.05 1.03 1.03 
1966 1.03 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 
1967 1.02 1.02 1.08 1.09 1.05 
1968 1.06 1.09 1.05 1.16 1.09 
1969 1.18 1.19 1.27 1.43 1.27 
1.27 1.07 1.05 1.09 1.12 
1971 1.10 1.10 1.08 1.08 1.09 
1972 1.07 1.05 1.03 1.05 1.05 
1973 1.07 1.09 1.06 1.01 1.06 
1974 1.03 1.03 1.06 1.06 1.05 
1.04 1.06 1.10 1.14 1.09 
1976 1.08 1.04 1.05 1.08 1.06 
1977 1.09 1.05 1.05 1.02 1.05 
1978 1.04 1.07 1.06 1.09 1.07 
1979 1.09 1.07 1.06 I.OB 
Sources: Official exchange rates - IMF Financial Statistics;
Black market exchange rates - Pick's Currencv
Yearbook. 
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market over guiding rates could have easily taken place. That they did 
not do so suggests that the system of gradual and continuously changing 
exchange rates, while not eliMinating disruptive speculation totally, has 
dampened it to a good extent. 
3. Generalized Floating of Major Currencies 
and Effective Exchange Rates 
So far, the discussion has focused only on the nominal peso-dollar 
exchange rate. No account has yet been taken of the fact that since the 
early seventies, major currencies have been floating. Under such circums­
tances, pegging to any one of them implies floating vis-a-vis the curren­
cies of other trading partners. It is therefore necessary to have a 
measure of the value of the domestic currency in relation to a representa­
tive set of currencies rather than merely to that of the intervention 
currency. Such a measure is the "effective exchange rate" (EER), which 
is defined as a weighted average of the exchange rates of the Philippines' 
d . 16tra 1ng partners. An EER index measures the proportional change in the 
Philippine peso vis-a-vis the currencies of the country's trading partners 
relative to a selected base period (Rhomberg, 1976). Different EER indices 
can be computed, depending among others, on the base period selected, the 
partner countries included, the weighing scheme emnloyed and the t~e of 
averaging formula used. The factors of greatest consequence are, however, 
which partner countries to include in the index and what weighing scheme 
to use. The former is dictated by the geogranhical pattern of trade, while 
the appropriate choice of weights depends on the particular objectives of 
analysis or nolicy (Branson and Katseli, 1978; 1980). If ri denotes units 
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of domestic currency per unit of the currency of trading ~artner i, and 
w. represents the weight for trading partner i, then the effective exchange -i 
rate index Eis given by 
(1) 
where a dot over a variable indicates a ~roportional change in that varia-
ble, I w. = 1, and i = 1, ••• ,n trading partners. The subscript o refersi
i 
to the home country so that it o. 
Let r = units of home currency per unit of numeraire currency (in0 
the Philippine case, pesos per U.S. dollar), and rt= units of currency 
i per unit of numeraire, e.g., yen per U.S. dollar, DM per U.S. dollar, 
etc. The exchange rate ri is obtained from the ratio of r tor*; hence 
0 i 
(2) 
Substituting (2) in (1) and recalling that I w = 1 yields
i i 
(3) 
It can be readily seen from (3) that even if the peso-dollar rate 
r were to remain fixed, the effective exchange rate can change whenever0 
the dollar's relationship with third country currency changes. More im-
portant, these changes may not reflect the balance of payments adjustment 
needs of the country and may undermine rather than enhance the pursuit of 
domestic policy objectives. For example, the country may find its effec-
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tive exchange rate appreciating when the current account is weakening and 
vice versa. 
In principle, it would be possible to maintain a "desired" or target 
effective exchange rate by making compensatory adjustments in the inter­
vention currency. In terms of (3), this means setting E = O, giving 
r .. E w.f~ (4)
0 i l. 1 
This is a policy that adjusts the intervention rate to hold the nominal 
effective exchange rate constant. The policy can alternatively be to 
stabilize a given real 11ather than nominal exchange rate. In this case, 
the real effective exchange rate index E is defined by 
(5) 
where p = home-country price or cost index; and P. = price or cost index0 . l. 
in country i. Substituting (2) into (5), adding and subtracting the cost 
or price index in the numeraire country, pn' and recalling once again 
that r w. = 1, the expression for E becomes
. i l. 
(6) 
The policy of stabilizing a target real effective exchange rate 
requires that E = O, so that 
ro + pn - po (7) 
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As (4) and (7) imply, pegging to a basket of currencies defined by a set 
of weights w. is equivalent to holding constant an effective exchange rate ~~ 1 
similarly defined by those weights (Branson and Katseli, 1982). 
The Philippine monetary authorities are not known to have made 
adjustments in the peso-dollar exchange rate on the basis of the above 
considerations. Moreover, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) does not 
report the country as changing intervention rates according to a set of 
indicators, such as differential;rates of inflation. trade or current 
account positions, stock of reserves, etc. Thus, it woula be interesting 
to determine what the adjustments in the peso-dollar exchange rate imply 
in terms of nominal and real effective exchange rates, as well as what 
factors can explain the rate of crawl of the intervention rater and 
0 
effective exchange rate E. 
Calculation of EER Indices 
Quarterly nominal and real EER indices for the period 1973 - to 1981 
are are 
based on the average annual trade shares of eight industrialized countries 
who have at least a one per cent share in total Philippine trade with all 
industrialized countries during 1974-1976 (Table 7). The first quarter of 
1973 (1973:I) is designated as the base period because the exchange rate 
prevailing during that quarter may be what could be considered aas 
"desireable" levei. 18 Two sets of real EER indices are calculated, namely: 
one based on the consumer price index (CPI) and another based on the whole­
sale price index (WPI). The data for exchange rates and prices are those 
reported in IMF's International Financial Statistics, while the bilateral 
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Table 7 
AVERAGE BILATERAL TRADE \..'EIGHTS.!./ 
(1974-1976) 
Export Import Total Trade 
Weights \.:eights Weights 
United States 42.1 34.6 38.2 
Japan 37.8 41.0 39.6 
Netherlands 8.6 1.9 5.0 
Germany 3.8 5.6 4.8 
United Kingdom 3.4 5.6 4.5 
Australia 1. 7 6.0 3.9 
France 1.6 2.9 2.3 
Canada 1.0 2.4 1.7 
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 
a/ Computed from trade data published in I~, Direction of Trade. 
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\..'eights are derived from I!-'IF 1 s Direction of Trade. 
Analysis of EER Movements 
From 1973:I to 1981:IV, the trade ~eighted effective exchange rate 
depreciated by 26.8 per cent. As Figure 2 shows, the effective depreciation 
was not continuous, but the upward trend in EER is clear. The trends of 
both the CPI-based real EER and WPI-based real EER are less elear. The CPI-
based real EER is characterized by annreciation during 1973:I to 1974-III, 
depreciation in 1974:IV to 1978:III, appreciation in 1978:IV to 1979:IV and 
relative stability in 1980:I to 1981:IV. The WPI-based real EE1{ follows 
roughlv a similar trend except in the second (1974:IV to 1978:III) and 
last (1980:I to 1931:IV) sub-periods. Over the whole period from 1973:I 
to 1~81:IV, all ouarterly real EER 1 s lay below the base quarter level, ex­
cent for three quarters in 1978 when the CFI-based real EER exceeded the 
EER in 1973:I. In 1981:IV, the CPI-based real EER was 13.4 per cent below 
the 1973:I rate, while the WPI-hased real EER was 23.3 per cent below the 
base quarter level. If the exchan~e rate policy were one committed to 
maintaining the real effective exchange rate at the 1973:I level, the im­
plied intervention rate in 1981:IV is 19.15 per U.S. dollar in the case of 
the CPI-based real EER and 19.08 per U.S. dollar in the case of the WPI-
19 
based real EER. 
To what extent have nominal EER changes been due to adjustments in the 
peso-dollar intervention rater, and to what extent have they been due to
0 
exogenous currency realignments? The ratio of the net change in the cur-
tencies of the Philippines' major trading oartners to the change in the 
intervention currency nrovides an idea of the relative magnitudes involved. 
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Over the period 1973:I to 1981:IV, the average quarterly ratio is 1.42, 
implying that on average, exogenous currency changes have been 42 per cent 
greater than those undertaken by the monetary authorities. Excluding the 
first year of generalized currency floating, however, the comnarable ratio 
i~ 0.64, indicating that on average, exogenous currency movements have been 
relatively smaller than adjustments in the intervention rate. The relative 
influence on EER's of exogenous and policy-determined exchange rate changes 
can also he seen in Figure 3. 
One aspect of exchange rate flexibility that has caused concern is 
that of the variability of exchange rates which may increase uncertaintv 
and thus, adversely affect trade and investment flows (Bautista, 1979). 
The risks involved can be reduced by recourse to the forward market, but 
but as mentioned earlier, forward cover is only available to transactions 
involving swap arrangements; hence, the question of increased uncertainty 
remains an irn?ortant issue. In order to determine whether effective 
exchange rates have exhibited more variability during the period of 
exchange rate flexibility relative to the earlier period of fixed exchange 
rates, the variability of monthly nominal effective exchange rates during 
1973-1981 is compared to the corresponding variability during 1964-1972. 
The measure of variability employed is the standard deviation of monthly 
nominal exchange rates about the mean during each period. For purposes of 
comparison, the variability of the intervention exchange rate (r) is also 
0 
presented in Table 8 below. Nominal effective rates do not appear to have 
become more variable during the period of generalized currenty floating. 
Their v~riability is in fact reduced when the first two years of the float­
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their variability being very much reduced in 1973-1981. Intervention rates 
were clearly less variable than effective exchange rates in the recent period, 
but slightly more variable than the latter in 1964-1972. These observations 
bring to mind Black's (1976) conclusion that "countries which ••• maintain 
overvalued exchange rates and then devalue them sharply suffer high varian­
ces in their effective exchange rates ••• " (pp. 35-36). 
Table 8 
VARIABILITY OF INTERVENTION AND EFFECTIVE EXCHANGE RATES 
1964-1972 1973-1981 1975-1981 
Effective Exchange Rates 16.7 12.0 10.7 
Intervention Rates 17.6 5.2 3.3 
4. Official Exchange Market Intervention Behavior 
Section 2 of this paper indicated that because of the lack of inter­
national capital market integration, the Philippine financial system is 
not able to provide a stable market in foreign exchange, thus, precluding 
free floating as a feasible alternative. Under such circumstances, the 
Central Bank must "make the market" (Branson and Katseli, 1978; p. 10). 
And the far ranging direct and indirect controls exercised by the Philippine 
monetary authorities over the foreign exchange market can be viewed in 
this context. 
Since changes in the exchange rate can he expected to be greatly 
influenced by official actions in the foreign exchange market, one way
\ 
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of analyzing movements in the peso-dollar exchange rate is to examine the 
behavior of the monetary authorities in the exchange market. Along this 
line, official exchange market intervention or reaction functions will be 
i 
\ 
estimated for the period 1973-1981, using quarterly data. The results of 
the analysis should be qualified by the partial character of the approach 
adopted here, as well as the inadequate treatment of the problem of simul­
taneity. Inasmuch as ideally, one would model official exchange market 
behavior within a more complete halance of payments framework, the effort 
taken in this paper should be considered as only one step towards the 
specification of an exchange market or balance of payments model. Further­
more, the estimated reaction functions should not be expected to neccesarily 
hold beyond the sample period or at all times during this period~ 
The Central Bank has no explicit exchange intervention policy except 
that of "maintaining the stability of exchange rates"; hence, alternative 
hypotheses regarding how the rate of cral-71 is determined are tested. Va­
rious suggestions concerning possible intervention rules (e.g., Cooper, 
1970; I!-ff Committee of Twenty, 1974; Black, 1976; Kenen, 1980) served as 
the starting point for formulating hypotheses about the monetary authori­
ties' behavior in the foreign exchange market~ The alternative hypotheses 
to be tested are that exchange rates are adjusted hy the Central Bank on 
the basis of: 
I. Equation (4) above, which implies that the Central Bank acts 
to stabilize the effective exchange rate. 
II. A Purchasing-Power-Parity (PP:P) rule, according to which ex­
change rate adjustments are made to comoensate for inflation differentials 
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between the domestic economy and those of major trading oartners. 
III. A reserve indicator, which calls for exchange rate changes 
depending on the stock of or changes in international reserves. 
IV. A balance of payments indicator, which links exchange rate 
alterations to current account or basic balance developments. 
Foreign exchange market intervention functions will be estimated using 
the change in the exchange rate as the dependent variable and indicators 
of intervention rules I to IV as explanatory variables. For the jth inter­
vention rule, for example, the general form of the regression equation is 
given by 
(8) 
where E* = change in the exchange rate; Ij 1 , ••• ,IjN = indicators for the 
jth intervention rule; ajo' aj 1 , ••• ,ajN are parameters to be estimated; 
and u = error or disturbance term. E* can be interpreted as the official 
target change in the exchange rate which is realized in every period; and the 
I's, as determinants of the target exchange rate change (Helliwell, 1979). 
In actual tests, E* is expressed in index form (1973:I • 100). Indices of 
intervention and effective exchange rates are alternatively used as the 
dependent variable, except in the case of intervention rule I where only 
the former is used. Lagged values of indicators are included as explana­
tory variables, where appropriate. 
The regression results are summarized in Table 9. Only the "best" 
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Tahle 9 
:-'l'''.'!..\R.Y nr REGR.[Ssrn::-;¢1 
I. Effective Exc~an~e ~ate ~ule 
LJI:R. ·= 2. 7b 1). (jJ7LJ G. 081 I,r, + o.on,x + (),%31,'J
(3.7J) (0.625) (0.504) (1.007) (0.351) 
..J.. 0. 060T.K + 0.177L\ + 0.148LC'
(l.UCJO) (2.lYS) (1. 1)52) 
d .,.· . 1. 71 p 
'.-WTf: L::ET: = log of noT11iric1l exchange rate index; L.J, TP, LT-',
L.··:, L:'., L\, LC: = J.og of exc11ange rate indices of cur­
rencies of .ra...,an, r,ermanv, !"ranee, '.-Jet'1erlands, l:ni tPd
:'ir>c,do~, :\ustralia and Can!'lda (in terms of L'.f'. dollars),
rc3,-,ective1,.,. 
i.:l''. = 4.66 -'- ;),1')7',Tlf 
(177.4) (1.2::i5) 
0.99f cl. i '. = n.n1. 
:J. L:r=r=·~ = 4.63 + .J,134L~'"
("1.-J) (Cl. YJ] ) 
d.:.~. = l.B2 
·: YJ'L: ~:NI.:'. = as .'efinc<l in T al·ove; u:r:n. = lo? of effective
exc'ian~,-~ rate index; U'-::' = lor, of the ratio of Philippine
CPI to weighted average of foreign CPI. 
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2. u:: = 51.3 Cl. (Hl3C,fS 
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-") . IT.". = 1() 2. 13 + n. ')06~T1fC O.'J02CRFS 
(13.')) ( 2. ') 74) ((),674) 
p2 = 0.803 d., .-. = l.80 p = 0. ,q 0, 
~WTE: :~ER= no!!linal exchange rate index; EET' = effective 
exclianr,e rate index. 
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p· . Current ,\ccoun t' and Ea sic !',a lance Indicators 
-- '!-A. Curn~nt Account f.alance (CAI',) 
1. '.{ER = 104.4 o. oosr.A T>, O. 005r.AP, (-1) o.onscAt<(-2) \
i 
(64.1) (2.724) (3,053) (2.337) 
-?
" - =:\. 0.948 d •' .• = 1.46 p = O.B3 
2. rEr = ll0.9 n.()02CfT 0,002CAB(-1) n.noBCAP.(-2)
(19. 9) (0.710) (0.823) (2.58'1) 
:,_"-
_') 
= 0.78~ d. ~-~. = 1. 75 p = 0.93 
b. Lasi c Eal-'lnce (:CB) 
1. :~n 108.3 ll ,Ofl3f,B 0. 002 ?,P. (-_1) l),003BR(-2)
(57.6) (1.510) (1.128) (1. 53')) 
~2 = U.922 d. ,:._,. = 1.17 p = 0.87 
2. fITt = 113.6 + 0. OOli',D 0,004RR(-1)
(22.5) (0.537) (1.622) 
;-;2
,\ = (1. 777 d. , .• = 1.8'1 p = 0.94 
:'.JTL: NEl{ = nominal exchange rate index; EER = effective exchan<;e
rate index; CAB(-1) = CAB lagged one quarter; CAf' (-2) = CAP
lagged t1:o nuarters; same ,dth f.TL 
a/ :.l•solute values of t-statistics arc in parentheses; estimation
bv Cochrane-Orcutt iterative techniriue. 
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equations in each hynothesized set are reported in the table in order to 
have a clearer focus in the analysis. The criteria for the best estimated 
equation in each set consist of the standard tests for goodness of fit, 
i.e., the coefficient of multinle determination adjusted for degrees of 
- -2freedom (R ), the standard errors (or t-statistics) of the estimated coef-
ficients, and the Durbin-Watson (D.W.) statistic.20 The results of other 
tests are mentioned in the text. An overview of the findings follows: 
1. No SU?port is provided to the hypothesis that the monetarv 
authorities act so as to stabilize the effective exchange rate. Except 
for the coefficient of the Australian dollar, all the estimated coefficients 
are not significantly different from zero. Nevertheless, it is interesting 
to note that the U.S. dollar has the highest implicit weight of 36.0 ner 
cent (derived from the relationshi? w = 1 - ! w where the weights 
u.s. i i, 
w.'s are the estimated coefficients). In an alternative regression using
1 
the Japanese yen as the numeraire, an implicit weight for the U.S. dollar 
of 60.0 per cent was obtained. This is not surprising, since the Philippine 
currency has been closely tied to the D.S. dollar. What is difficult to 
explain is the very low weight implicitly placed on the Japanese yen (3.7 
per cent) and the relatively high weight of the Australian dollar (17.7 per 
cent). 
2. The results likewise reject the hypothesis that the monetarv 
authorities follo~ a PPP-rule. The coefficient of the relative CPI term 
is not close to unity and not significantly different from zero, while 
the constant is highly significant. This is true for both nominal and 
effective exchange rates. Regressions using WPI instead of CPI, and 
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regression equations incorporating lagged values of the explanatory 
variable were also estimated, but these did not yield better results. 
\
l: 
3. The data do not show that the stock of reserves (SRES) is an 
important determinant of nominal exchange rate adjustments, although it 
appears to be a significant determinant in the case of effective exchange 
rates. However, the coefficient of SRES is positive in the latter case, 
contrary to~ priori considerations. The coefficient of SRF.S in the 
regression equation for nominal exchange rates is also positive, but it 
is not significantly different from zero. Regressions using the change 
in reserves (CRFS) intead of SRES, as well as those using both SRES and 
CRES as explanatory variables did not yield significant coefficients both 
for nominal and effective exchange rates. 
4. The results supoort the hypothesis that the Central Bank, on 
average, adjusts nominal exchange rates in accordance with current account 
balance (CAB) developments. The relationship is significant up to a lag 
of two quarters, implying that adjustment of the inteTVention ~~tP dPpPnn~ 
on current account developments during the current period and in the recent 
past. All of the coefficients are also of the expected signs. In regres­
sions involving: (1) only the contemporaneous CAB; and (2) the contempo­
raneous CAB and CAB lagged one quarter, all the coefficients of the 
explanatory variables are not significantlv different from zero. On the 
other hand, the coefficients of CAR beyond a lag of two quarters are not 
significant. Regressions involving the basic balance, as well as those 
using the effective exchange rate as the dependent variable oerformed poor­
ly. These results confirm the point made in Section 2 above regarding the 
!. 
38 
paramount importance of the current account in determining the exchange 
rate in a financial setting such as the one in the Philippines. 
5. On the whole, the regression equations for nominal exchange rates 
performed much better than those for effective exchange rates, implying 
that monetary authorities make adjustments in the intervention rate on the 
basis of nominal rather than effective exchange rate considerations. The 
outcome of the tests involving the hy"othesized intervention rule I is con­
sistent with this observation. 
Thus, for the whole oeriod 1973-1981, the Central Bank's reaction 
function for nominal ueso-dollar exchange rates can be specified in terms 
of responses to exchange market pressure manifested by current account 
developments in the contemporaneous as well as fairly recent periods. 
This behavior is both plausible and reasonable. The implied assumntion is 
that adjustments made on such basis will lead to less fundamental dis­
equilibrium and therefore, less need for abrupt and disruptive changes. 
The discussions in Sections 1 and 2 above appear to lend validity to this 
presumption. 
However, because attention is focused on nominal rather than effective 
exchange rates, changes in the latter have not always been in the direction 
suggested by the needed adjustment. A look at Figure 4 will show that in 
many instances during 1973-1981, a weakening of the current account is 
associated with an appreciation of the effective exchange rate and vice 
versa. In order to avoid such perverse develooments, it would be necessa­
ry for the monetary authorities to use effective exchange rate formula­
tions in determining the extent and direction of intervention. This need 
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will become more pronounced if the trend towards greater geographical 
diversification of the country's external trade continues. Moreover, in 
view of the more rapid rates of Philippine inflation relative to its 
trading partners, an exchange policy aimed at stabilizing a given real 
effective exchange rate may be advisable, in order to ensure that the 
country's international competitive position is not grossly eroded. At 
the minimum, the monetary authorities should be constantly vigilant of 
changes in real effective exchange rates. 
5. Conclusions 
This paper has attempted to evaluate, in a rat~er limited sense, the 
exchange experience of the Philiopines during the period of generalized 
currency floating. The nature of the post-1970 exchange rate regime was 
analyzed, and various implications of flexibility of the country's own 
as well a~ other countries' exchange rates were discussed. Furthermore, 
changes in the peso-dollar exchange rate were examined in the li~ht of 
official intervention behavior in the foreign exchange market. 
The exchange rate regime in the Philippines during the post-1970 
period is characterized by limited rather than full flexibility, and the 
domestic currency can be more appropriately described as "crawling" rather 
than floating vis-a-vis the U.S. dollar. In many respects, this system 
has assisted the country in weathering the external shocks which began with 
the oil crisis in 1973-1974 without the exchange upheavals that occurred 
in the 1950 1 s and 1960's. While external balance is yet to be achieved, 
the system of limited exchange rate flexibility has probably prevented 
more fundamental disequilibrium from developing, making abrupt and disruP-
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tive exchange rate adjustments less of a possibility. In the future, it 
would be important for the monetary authorities to retain flexibility in 
exchange rate policy, in order to ensure continuing adjustments to external 
imbalances. 
The results of the analysis of official intervention behavior in the 
Philippine foreign exchange market demonstrate the importance of the cur­
rent account in the exchange rate adjustments undertaken by the monetary 
authorities, as well as the latter's commitment to the nominal peso-dollar 
exchange rate. The second observation can perhaps be explained by the 
peso's traditional link to the U.S. dollar; however, in a world of floating 
exchange rates, the country is not immune from disturbances generated by 
exogenous currency realignments. Thus, it would be imoortant for the 
monetary authorities to consider effective exchange rate formulations in 
determining both the extent and direction of intervention. Furthermore, 
from the viewpoint of maintaining international competitiveness, it would 
be advisable, at the very least, for the monetary authorities to be vigi-
lant of changes in real effective exchange rates. 
More specifically, the Central Bank may find it helpful to have a 
formula or set of criteria for adjusting exchange rates which take into 
account changes in the exchange rates of major tradin~ partners, in addi­
tion to such factors as current account developments and differential rates 
of inflation. Needless to say, such formula or criteria need not be made 
public, nor should it be construed to be a rigid, permanent guide for 
managing the exchange rate. All of these obviously require greater tech­
nical capability within the Central Bank for such needs as the selection 
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of appropriate weights, analysis of domestic and foreign price and currency 
movements, monitoring of developments in the world economy, short-term 
economic forecasting and formulation of policy resnonses to external dis­
turbances, among other things. 
This study has probably only scratched the surface, as far as research 
on Philippine exchange rate policy is concerned. A logical extension 
would be the formulation and estimation of an exchange rate or balance. 
of payments model within ~hich it may be possible to look into the inter­
actions among monetary, fiscal and exchange rate policies, and to study 
the effects of external disturbances, such as those generated by exogenous 
currency changes, on domestic inflation and trade flows. 
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Footnotes 
1. See Diaz-Alejandro (1974), Helleiner (1974), and Cline (1976) for
an elaboration on the various issues involved. 
2. It was not until November 1965, however, when the peso was
formally devalued. 
3. The terms of trade index (1973 c °IOO) declined continuously from
130.4 in 1974 to 78.1 in 1980. 
4. For instance, no severe restrictions reminiscent of the 1950's
and 1960's were instituted in the 1970's. And in 1980, the government
initiated a tariff reduction program accompanied by the liberalization of
the importation of previously banned categories of imports (Central Bank
of the Philippines Annual Report, 1981; p. 53). While the availability of
external financing certainly contributed to these develoµments, the regime
of flexible exchange rates must be considered a complimentary element.
As Baldwin (1975; p. 74) observes: " ••• foreign borrowings can in.itiate
periods of orosperity but unless ••• accompanied by exchange rate policies
designed to maintain a vigorous export sector, these periods of economic
activity are doomed to end suddenly as balance of payments problems even­
tually build u-p to a crisis." 
5. See Central Bank of the Philippines Annual Reports for 1970, 1971
and 1972 for a more detailed explanation. In particular, see Central Bank
Circular No. 289 dated February 21, 1970 and Central Bank Circular No. 340
dated April 7, 1972. 
6. Central Bank of the Philippines, "Trade and Payments System of the
Philippines," June 30, 1980 (mimeographed)~ P. 1. 
7. See Central Bank of the Philippines Annual Reports, 1971-1980.
The format of reporting is not similar for all years, e.g., in some years,
the volume of commercial bank trading in foreign exchange is reported,
while in other years, it is not. The trend is clear, however. 
8. Foreign exchange receipts from Philippine exports and a numher
of invisible transactions, e.g., foreign exchange earnings of resident
owners or operators of ocean-going vessels, U.S. dollar pension received
by Philippine residents, and foreign exchange acquisition of resident in­
surance companies, are required to be surrendered to the Central Bank or
its agent banks, and thus, not eligible for deposit. See Central Bank of the
Philippines Circular No. 343 dated Aoril 24, 1972. 
9. Williamson (1965; p. 2) defines the "crawling peg" as a "system
under which such par changes as occur are implemented slowly, in such a
large number of small steps as to make the process of exchange rate adjust­
ment continuous for all practical purposes: a system, therefore, under
which the peg crawls from one level to another." 
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10. The average increase in the Philippine CPI during 1973-1981 was 
14.2 per cent per year, as compared to a trade weighted average increase 
of 9.5 per cent per year in the CPI's of the U.S., Japan, Canada, France, 
Germany, Australia, the U.K. and Netherlands during the same period. 
11. This consists of official grants and long-term capital. From 
1973-1981, direct foreign investments and nrivate borrowings accounted 
for only an average of about 20 per cent of net inflows reported under 
this balance of payments item; hence, much of the increase are due to 
public borrowings. 
12. See Donges (1972) for a discussion of the Brazilian experience. 
13. For a more detailed account of the control system, see Baldwin 
(1975). 
14. The decontrol program was primarily directed at dismantling the 
very stringent and complicated controls introduced in the late 1950 1 s. 
Baldwin (1975; p. 58) notes: "•·• exchange controls were removed, but 
liberalization in the sense of a significant easing of all controls over 
imports did not occur." Furthermore, restrictions remained on domestic 
citizens' dealings in foreign exchange and foreign securities. These 
explain the existence of differentials even during the decontrol period. 
15. The standard deviation of monthly black market exchange rates 
about the mean during 1964-1972 is 18.5, as compared to 6.1 during 1973-
1979. 
16. This definition differs from that adopted in the NBER set of 
studies (Krueger, 1975) on the effects of liberalization in a number of 
LDC's. The "effective exchange rate" in the NBER studies is defined as 
the number of domestic currency units actually paid or received per unit 
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(for a specific transaction or sector) for surcharges, tariffs, implicit 
interests foregone on guarantee deposits, and other charges on imports 
and subsidies on exports. 
17. These are the appropriate weights to use in the small country 
case when the objective of policy is the stabilization of the domestic 
relative price of tradable goods (Black, 1976; Branson and Katseli, 1978). 
Other objectives which have been suggested are the minimization of fluc­
tuations in the terms of trade and the current account (Branson and 
Katseli, 1980), the stabilization of the variance of the real effective 
exchange rate (Lipschitz and Sundararajan, 1980), and the stabilization 
of domestic real income (Turnovsky, 1980). Black suggests that the 
stabilization of the domestic relative price of tradable goods may be the 
appropriate objective for a small open LDC economy: "••• less developed 
countries typically have little influence over their terms of trade, so 
that the main channel through which exchange rates affect the economy is 
the ratio of traded goods prices to non-traded goods prices" (p. 37). 
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The Philippines accounts for a major portion of world trade in 
coconut oil. However, a large share in trade in specific connnodities does 
not necessarily imply export market ?Ower in view of substitution possibi­
lities, among other things. In the case of coconut oil, the presence of 
closely competing substitutes, such as palm, soybean and cottonseed oils, 
and synthetic products, has prevented the Philippines from exercising any 
significant market power. Thus, the small country assumption holds for 
the Philippines. 
18. Ttis is not meant to say, however, that the exchange rate 
prevailing in 1973:I is necessarily the "equilibrium exchange rate." 
Krueger (1975) points out that while an equilibrium exchange rate can be 
precisely defined in theory, it is elusive in empirical work; hence, she 
defines the equilibrium rate as one not requiring quantitative restrictions 
or foreign borrowings to bolster or prevent reserve depletion. This is 
not "conceptually satisfactory ••• however, it suffices for empirical 
analysis in most instances" (pp. 62-63). Following this definition, a 
period characterized by a surplus in the balance of pavments mav be more 
suitable as a base than one registering zero balance or deficits in view 
of the existence of various exchange and trade restrictions. The implied 
assumption is that if these restrictions were removed, the external accounts 
would tend to balance, and reserves would remain unchanged at the same 
exchange rate. During 1973:I, a BOP surplus of U.S. $191 million was posted;
foreign borrowings were relatively modest (U.S. $17 million). Except for 
1973:lI, BOP performance in the following quarterly periods were not as 
strong as that in 1973:I; foreign borrowings also increased substantially 
after 1973:II. 
19. These figures may vary according to the base period selected. 
20. In most instances, the final choice depended on the level of 
significance of the estimated coefficients. 
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